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Abstract
A general information-theoretic framework for deriving physical laws is presented
and a principle of informational physics is enunciated within its context. Existing
approaches intended to derive physical laws from information-theoretic first principles
are unified as special cases of this framework with the introduction of constraints
dependent on the physical process of observation. Some practical, theoretical and
epistemological implications of the validity of this approach are examined.
1 Introduction
The consideration of information (subjectively, awareness) as a fundamental ontological en-
tity is a view with an extremely illustrious pedigree in several Idealistic traditions of phi-
losophy1. In the past half century, this philosophical position has been adopted by some
scientific/computational programs and specified to various degrees of rigor in various rep-
resentational structures, e.g. [16, 18, 15]. While many of these observers have designed
different perspectives on the subject, the theme of a fundamental informational nature of
1In the Western traditions, see e.g., Neoplatonism, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Berkeley’s Imma-
terialism. Advaita and Zen are good examples from the East. Sufism and Gnosticism are good representatives
from the Semitic traditions.
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reality runs through all their narratives. These are, in general terms, the philosophical ap-
proaches to informational physics. They begin with an ontological assumption regarding the
nature of reality and attempt to find representational theories of sufficient expressiveness
and precision to be able to make testable statements in the physical world.
In a different epistemological context, beginning with Frieden [4], there have been several
sporadic efforts (see, e.g., [6, 12, 9]) made to re-derive the foundational principles of quantum
mechanics with a probabilistic and/or information-theoretic basis, making no physical as-
sumptions. This effort is philosophically appealing because of the nebulous understanding of
the role of the observer and the observer’s effect on the wave function in the standard Copen-
hagen interpretation. Furthermore, since most theories of physics, including the Standard
Model, are generally expressed as quantum field theories, an information-theoretic interpre-
tation of QFT, if justifiable, directly affects the entire epistemological basis of physics. As
a matter of fact, a controversial information-theoretic unification model has already been
proposed [6] by Frieden as an extension to his original approach [4]. These constitute what
we call the mathematical approaches to informational physics. They begin from an agnostic
epistemic viewpoint, operating entirely within existing representational frameworks of prob-
ability and information and attempt to characterize the ontological assumptions necessary
for their mathematical findings to be consistent with existing theories of reality in the same
mathematical representation.
In this brief note, we examine prospects of unifying the philosophical and mathematical
currents of informational physics. We do so by formulating the problem of information op-
timization in a general mathematical setting. We then discuss how the simple selection of
an information measure (frequentist probability) and its physical interpretation allows us to
recover statistical mechanics from our general framework, an insight first gleaned by Jaynes
[8]. We remark on the prospect of employing a similar approach to deriving quantum me-
chanics for large systems, viz., quantum field theories, an observation independently made by
Lisi [9]. We further note how a different choice of information measure (Fisher Information)
recovers Frieden’s derivation of Schrodinger’s equation [5] as well as (within some interpre-
tative latitude) his broader Extreme Physical Information framework [6] of informational
physics. Finally, using heuristic arguments, we suggest that this apparent unity offers us
insight into both the nature of physical laws as well as the surprising comprehensibility of
physics using mathematics [17].
2
2 Information optimization
Let S represent the set of possible outcomes in an isolated system under observation, where
every outcome s ∈ S is a set of variables that sufficiently represent the system behavior for
each outcome. For example, for a classical point particle (position x, momentum p) moving
in a straight line, {x, p} is a sufficient representation. In order to study changes in outcomes,
we consider each outcome s to be a continuous function of a set of parameters t.
If we were to consider the problem of obtaining knowledge in the broadest epistemic sense,
an observer would be ignorant of the membership of S. To be able to make meaningful
statements about information optimization, we require that an observer possess information
about the existence of at least some s ∈ S2. The goal of the observer is two-fold. In the
first place, he wishes to explain the relative frequency of occurrence of different outcomes
of the system with a theory. We consider a good theory to be one which explains the rel-
ative frequencies of the occurrence of outcomes with a set of statements of a much lower
Kolmogorov complexity [7, Ch.1-2] than the set of statements required to describe the oc-
currence of outcomes. In the second, he would like to be able to make predictions regarding
the behavior of unobserved outcomes of the system based on his observation of past out-
comes. Note that these two aspects of episteme need not be related, e.g., the true theory
regarding a fair coin,‘This is a random process’, implies that prediction becomes impossible,
whereas predicting a coin will show up heads (or tails) because it has shown up heads thrice
before is a process fraught with peril3.
For either (or both) of these purposes, the observer associates a level of certainty or uncer-
tainty with each possible outcome of the system. Let us denote this with an information
measure f(s), the choice of which will determine the form of the solution to the information
optimization problem. Furthermore, since multiple outcomes are feasible, the observer must
construct an aggregate measure of certainty (or uncertainty). In general, we can denote this
by F : S ′ → R, where S ′ ⊆ S and depends on the observer’s knowledge of the membership
of the system.
2This is equivalent to saying that no meaningful discussion of a coin-tossing experiment can commence
unless the subject knows it has two outcomes. He need not know that the two outcomes occur with equal
probability.
3As a quick visit to the nearest roulette table at one’s friendly neighborhood casino would readily demon-
strate!
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Now that the observer has quantified the extent of his knowledge/ignorance of the system, he
must adjust these quantities to account for observations of system outcomes that he makes.
The method of adjustment employed, which is essentially inference may be arbitrary, but
a principled approach would be to employ Bayesian inference. While this might appear to
constrain the generality of our informational framework, it must be noted that the Bayesian
formalism has been shown to be quite generally applicable and along with the axioms of
probability, appears to be quite fundamental to the way in which humans naturally think
[13]. Therefore, to assume that the system of updates that the observer employs will be
Bayesian in nature does not appear to be overly restrictive.
Note further that Bayesian inference has been shown to be equivalent [3] to the principle of
maximum relative entropy [11], an extension of Jaynes’ famous original MaxEnt principle [8]
applicable to uniform prior distributions to arbitrary priors. MaxEnt, therefore, is a special
case of Bayesian inference, where one begins with an agnostic belief regarding one’s current
state of knowledge. This, naturally, exposes the argument to the same opposition that
proponents of MaxEnt face in general. It should therefore be emphasized that the MaxEnt
assumption is not a crucial aspect of this framework and is used here to simplify our analysis
in the examples that we consider. The general Bayesian argument (or its maximum relative
entropy equivalent) constitute our general system of updates.
Having defined our terms of reference, we can now state our informational physics hypoth-
esis somewhat more formally as a principle assumed in all our subsequent derivations. The
principle of informational physics states that an observer’s task of developing a theory con-
cerning the evolution of the system characterized by a space of outcomes S is equivalent to
extremizing a measure of his information/ignorance F constrained by what he believes-he-
knows4 about the system. Known physical laws emerge as mathematically optimal solutions
to this information extremization procedure.
4The problem of distinguishing between believe-he-knows and knows is one that we will not address in
this paper.
4
3 Physical laws
3.1 Realistic information measures
While a plethora of information/uncertainty measures (see e.g. [14]) can be used within
the information framework defined in Section 2, the one that is most commonly used in
learning theory is Shannon entropy with an underlying frequentist definition of probability,
i.e., assuming p[s] measures the frequency of occurrence of outcome s in the space of known
outcomes s ∈ S ′, the observer’s uncertainty f(s) with respect to the outcome s is given by
−p[s] log p[s] and the aggregate uncertainty across all known paths F (S ′) as
F (S ′) = −
∑
s∈S′
p[s] log p[s] = −
∫
s∈S′
p[s] log p[s] ds. (1)
The F obtained here is precisely the Shannon entropy of the system and is a measure of
the uncertainty of the observer regarding the behavior of the system. Concomitantly, it is
possible to define F (s) as the information divergence of the observer’s hypothesis concerning
the system to the best5 theory. Representing both the observer’s hypothesis and the target
theory as distributions over the space of outcomes, we can use the standard definition of
information divergence (alternatively Kullback-Leibler divergence) to obtain an aggregate
information measure for the system, viz.,
Fb(S ′) =
∫
s∈S′
a[s] log
a[s]
b[s]
ds, (2)
where b[s] is the observer’s hypothesis and a[s] is the target theory.
Note that in this case, minimizing the information measure would result in the observer
finding a theory close to the optimal. Parenthetically, this recovers the MDI principle of
model selection first proposed by Kullback and subsequently extended via the AIC criterion
[1] to statistical model selection [2].
5This notion can be formalized in terms of compactness, predictability, some combination thereof or in
some other way.
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The third important information information measure we consider here is a variant of Fisher
Information first proposed in [4]]. Frieden [6] demonstrates that assuming n independent
measurements of outcomes as well as shift invariance in the system, it is possible to construct
an information measure of the form
F (s) = 4
∫
s∈S′
∑
n
∂q
∂s
· ∂q
∂s
ds, (3)
where p[s] = q2[s].
As we mention above, these are by no means the only information measures available. A
wide variety of distance (e.g. Levenshtein, Hellinger, Dudley) and divergence measures (e.g.,
the Bregman family of divergences) can be used to replace (2) [14]. Much work has been done
to generalize entropy measures e.g., Tsallis entropies, and multiple definitions of probability
abound. Thus, there are several information measures that may be used in place of the
ones we have considered6. The optimization problem and its interpretation must necessarily
remain the same. There is thus, much flexibility in this framework to allow for physical
theories to be constructed using different representations of information.
3.2 Statistical and quantum mechanics
From the arguments presented in Section 2, it is evident that the task of constructing a phys-
ical theory for observations made on a physical system is equivalent to solving an inference
problem given constraints on the observation process. Working with the entropic formula-
tion of F as defined in (1), we now define minimal constraints on the inference problem as
observed in the process of physical measurements.
For physical systems, it appears appropriate to conjecture that the probabilities p[s] of all
known outcomes should sum to one, .i.e., the observer should believe that he knows S (when,
6We feel, however, that such specific efforts may not be very useful in practice. A more general view of
information, on the other hand, would lack the mathematical rigor of our construction.
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in fact, he only knows S ′). Thus, the observer believes-he-knows
∑
s∈S′
p[s(t)] =
∫
s∈S′
p[s] ds = 1. (4)
Furthermore, in order to develop his theory, the observer, given multiple observations,
believes-he-knows how the system has been behaving. Mathematically, this means that
he believes-he-knows the expected value 〈A〉 of the history A[s] of the physical system given
multiple observations, where the history may be defined in any mathematical manner that
takes the past behavior of the system corresponding to outcome s into account. That is,
A¯ = 〈A〉 =
∫
s∈S′
A[s]p[s] ds. (5)
It is instructive to note here that the choice of information measure is independent of the
physical constraints imposed, and that the physical constraints imposed are consequent to
the process of observation, not the physical system being measured.
Recovering the optimal theory for the system using (1) as an information measure and (4),
(5) as informational constraints is now equivalent to extremizing,
F ′ = −
∫
s∈S′
p[s] log p[s] ds+ λ
(
1−
∫
s∈S′
p[s] ds
)
+ ν
(
A¯−
∫
s∈S′
p[s]A[s] ds
)
,
= λ+ νA¯−
∫
s∈S′
(p[s] log p[s] + λp[s] + νp[s]A[s]) ds.
Differentiating with respect to p[s] and setting the derivate to zero gives us
∫
s∈S′
(log p[s] + 1 + λ+ νA¯[s]) ds = 0,
which gives us an expression for p[s] of the form
p[s] =
1
Z
e−νA¯[s]. (6)
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Differentiating with respect to λ, Z = 1/e−1−λ which gives us,
Z =
∫
s∈S′
e−νA¯[s] ds. (7)
Similarly, we can determine ν by solving the equation
− ∂
∂ν
logZ = A¯. (8)
Now, note that Z, as defined in (7) has the structure of a partition function, while ν plays
the role of an intensive variable (does not depend on the cardinality of S ′). The physical
interpretation of this partition function may be inferred from the context of the domain of
the physical system. In the case of classical statistical ensembles, we specify the history of
the system in a configuration s to simply be the energy in that particular state and take
the intensive variable to be the familiar kBT . By doing so, we recover Jaynes’ information-
theoretic formulation of thermodynamics in the form of the well-known statistical canonical
ensemble
Z =
∑
states
e
−
1
kBT
E[state]
.
As Lisi points out, the formal similarity of the quantum partition function to the statistical
canonical ensemble implies that it can be derived along similar lines. Following Lisi [9], we
interpret the notion of history, in the case of a quantum ensemble, as the action S corre-
sponding to a particular path as understood in Feynman’s path integral formulation. The
intensive variable is taken as ı~. By doing so, we recover the quantum partition function7,
Z =
∑
paths
e−
1
ı~
S[path].
Thus, we see that using an entropic formulation of uncertainty about the possible outcomes
of a physical system allows us to derive partition functions that, afforded reasonable physical
interpretations, allow us to recover existing physical laws and explain the similarity in their
formal structure with a deeper informational hypothesis.
7Since it is possible to subsume all possible quantum actions in the informational framework we have
discussed in Section 2, it is tempting to declare victory for informational physics here. However, since we do
not have a characterization of the class of actions that have physical interpretations, we are far from being
in a position to do so.
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3.3 Extreme Physical Information
In Section 3.2, we have seen that using Shannon entropy as a measure of uncertainty allows us
to recover existing physical laws for macroscopic ensembles. Beginning from the observation
that a large number of physical laws are phrased in the form of second order differential
equations, Frieden [6] has suggested the possibility of deriving these laws through a general
framework called Extreme Physical Information (EPI) which operates on a principle of Fisher
Information extremization. In this Section, we examine the use of a Fisher Information
based measure in our general informational framework and find that our approach replicates
the basic mathematical structure of EPI without having to make any of its potentially
questionable metaphysical assumptions8.
Recall that the standard definition of Fisher Information is of the form
I =
∫ (
∂ log p(y|θ)
∂θ
)2
p(y|θ) dy, (9)
where p(y|θ) is some interpretation (we assume frequentist) of the probability of y con-
ditioned on θ. Fisher Information measures the amount of information that the random
variable y carries about the unknown parameter θ. In the context of physical systems,
we take y to represent the value of physical measurements and θ to be the true9 value of
the physical quantity being measured. Geometrically speaking, the informativeness in this
context is measured as a function of the steepness of the probability density function near
the maximum likelihood estimate of the unknown parameter. Thus, unlike Shannon en-
tropy, using Fisher Information as an uncertainty measure allows us to take local structure
in the definition of the support of the space of outcomes S into account. Finally, note
that since Fisher Information, like Kullback-Leibler divergence, measures informativeness in
comparison to an ideal theory, finding a good physical theory in this estimation framework
is equivalent to minimizing Fisher Information over the relevant domain. Without having
to resort to an observer-Nature information game (observer maximizes information, Nature
maximizes error), as posited in, e.g., [6, 14], we recover the basic mathematical principle of
EPI.
8In particular, we remove the necessity of an observer-Nature information game, the concept of ‘bound’
information and the necessity of Fourier transforms as a descriptor of symmetry
9In the informational context, ‘true’ is equivalent to the value predicted by the best theory.
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In general, the unknown parameter θ as well as the measurement y may be a V -dimensional
vector, e.g., the position of a point particle in RV . In that case we obtain a V × V Fisher
Information matrix. In physical measurements, the dimensions of the unknown parameter
will often be orthogonal in the sense that the MLEs will be independent. Thus, the off-
diagonal elements of the Fisher Information matrix will be zero, and the trace will be a
comprehensive measure of the informativeness of the estimation. It may also be necessary
to account for the effect of multiple observations y(n) : n = 1 · · ·N on the informativeness
of the estimation procedure for the unknown parameter θ(n)v at the n
th instance. Following
Frieden, the sum of the traces of the V ×V matrix corresponding to each observation can be
shown to be an upper bound on the Stam information of the system and is thus a bound on
the capacity of the estimation procedure to convey information about the measured quantity.
Also, from the assumption of independence, the joint probability p(y|θ) decomposes into a
product of marginals
∏N
n=1 pn(y
(n)|θ(n)), resulting in the following simplification,
F =
N∑
n=1
∫
p(y|θ)
V∑
v=1
(
∂ log p(y|θ)
∂θ(n)v
)2
dy(n),
=
N∑
n=1
∫
1
pn
V∑
v=1
(
∂pn
∂θ(n)v
)2
dy(n).
Finally, we assume shift invariance for the measurement process, i.e., the error in measure-
ment x(n) = y(n) − θ(n) is independent of the value of θ. Then, pn(y(n)|θ(n)) = pn(xn). To
recapitulate, we have shown that it is possible to define a scalar information measure based
on Fisher information that depends entirely on the fluctuations in the measurement process.
By replacing the probability density pn with the ‘real’ probability amplitude qn such that
pn = q
2
n and suppressing the index v in the notation (assuming measurements are made with
no preferred dimension), we get
F = 4
∫ ∑
n
∇qn · ∇qn dxn, (10)
which is equivalent to (3) with some additional physical interpretation of the outcome space
S attached. Specifically, whereas (3) measures informativeness in a general space of outcomes
s ∈ S, (10) measures informativeness corresponding to a physical measurement process where
the form and the physical interpretation of the outcome x = y − θ is well-specified. Since
physical laws dealing with idealized measurements are largely concerned with this specific
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class of outcomes, we use (10) in the remainder of this Section.
Using the principle of informational physics, deriving a physical law using (10) is equivalent to
minimizing the information measure F under constraints on the process of measurement. We
formulate these constraints following our treatment of the Shannon entropy case in Section
3.2. Since the information measure F has no outcome-specific probabilistic interpretation,
we will not have a density function normalization constraint analogous to (4). Analogous
to (5), however, we assume here that the observer, given multiple observations, believes-he-
knows how the system has been behaving. In this context, this translates into the assumption
that the observer’s empirical estimate of the expected history of all possible outcomes of the
system is accurate, i.e.,
A¯ = 〈A〉 =
∫
A(x)p(x)dx. (11)
Thus, the informational quantity to be minimized takes the form,
F ′ = 4
∫ ∑
n
∇qn · ∇qn dxn + λ
(
A¯−
∫
A(x)p(x)dx
)
, (12)
which is structurally equivalent to the K = I − J Lagrangian of EPI [6]. Comparing this
derivation of the EPI Lagrangian with that described in [4] in the specific context of the
derivation of the time-independent Schrodinger’s equation and subsequently explicated in
[6] to encompass a general framework that results in information-theoretic derivations of
the Dirac, Klein-Gordon and Maxwell’s equations, we see that our informational framework
not only subsumes the mathematical structure of EPI, but also motivates it in a far more
convincing manner by eliminating the need for defining a bound information functional [4] as
well as the requirement of taking a Fourier transform of the original information measure [6]
to do so. Thus, we find that we have removed a significant number of the ad hoc procedural
assumptions of EPI while recovering its mathematical structure as a special representational
implementation of a more general informational physics framework.
As an example of the application of the EPI method to deriving physical laws, we can briefly
interpret Frieden’s derivation of Schrodinger’s equation (in one-dimension) starting from
(12). The history A¯ is assigned a physical interpretation of kinetic energy of the particle
(potential energy would appear as a uniform background energy to an observer concerned
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solely with measuring the position of the particle). Recall that Schrodinger’s equation mea-
sures probability using complex probability amplitudes. These may be constructed from real
probability amplitudes qn(x)
ψn =
1√
N
(q2n−1 + ıq2n), n = 1 · · ·N/2,
with no loss of generality. Since the kinetic energy over N measurements is being considered,
we work with the quantity N〈Ekin〉. Following [6], the quantity 〈Ekin〉 can be expressed as
an expectation in terms of the probability distribution p(x) =
∑
n ψ
∗
nψn. Substituting in
(12) and working with the single-dimension case for simplicity of analysis, we obtain
F ′ = 4N
∫ ∑
n
∣∣∣∣dψn(x)dx
∣∣∣∣
2
dx+ λ
(
E¯kin − C
∫
Ekin
∑
n
|ψn(x)|2 dx
)
,
= 4N
∫ ∑
n
∣∣∣∣dψn(x)dx
∣∣∣∣
2
dx− λC
∫
[W − V (x)]
∑
n
|ψn(x)|2 dx+ λE¯kin.
Applying the Euler-Lagrange equation
d
dx
∂L
∂ψ′
=
∂L
∂ψ
,
with L = F ′, we get the solution,
ψ
′′
n(x) +
λC
4
[W − V (x)]ψn(x) = 0, n = 1, · · ·N/2. (13)
Setting λC = 8m
~2
recovers a physically meaningful Schrodinger’s equation without time
dependence.
The general EPI approach has been used in several physical, biological and economics appli-
cations over the past decade with varying degrees of success. However, it has not acquired
mainstream acceptance as a consequence of the arbitrary formulaic manner in which it has
been presented and the ad hoc metaphysical assumptions required to phrase it. It is hoped
that the derivation of the formal structure of EPI with our sparse set of assumptions might
occasion a re-evaluation of its utility.
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4 Discussion
Here, we summarize and discuss all the assumptions that we make in the process of deriving
physical laws from the assumption of the ontological primacy of information (subjectively,
awareness).
• Complete system description: In the first instance, deriving physical laws appears
to require that s ∈ S ⇒ s ∈ S ′, since the probability assignments p[s] to outcomes
s and all subsequent calculations are likely to be flawed irretrievably otherwise. This
distinguishes physical laws from general statistical inference where S ′ ⊂ S. It must
be clarified here that the use of the term complete to refer to the specification of
set S is a slight misnomer, since we appear to be attaching ontological reality to
S independent of the observer. This is partially true. While we could redress this
concern by allowing a superset of S to replace S (with S becoming yet another S ′ in
the process) whenever new information about the space of outcomes arises, such an
approach allows for an unintuitive infinite regress. It is felt that it is simpler to allow S
to have some ontological reality by considering it to be the space of outcomes observable
to a universal observer with (or holding the potential for)complete knowledge. The
ontological realism of this observer itself is a separate (and philosophically important)
question, but one that need not be addressed for the mathematical consistency of our
framework.
• Bayesian inference: We have assumed that observers update their beliefs about
the possibility of various outcomes occurring by observing the system’s behavior over
multiple instances. While any other system of inference would be equally acceptable,
for our demonstration of the emergence of physical laws, we have selected Bayesian
inference as the specific model. It would be very surprising, in the author’s opinion,
were another consistent system of inference to result in results radically different from
the Bayesian approach. Thus, we feel that it is sufficiently general to require no
additional justification.
• Agnosticism about outcomes: Since we have worked throughout our exposition
with either the MaxEnt specialization of Bayesian inference or an equivalent Fisher In-
formation minimization, we have assumed that observers do not assume any knowledge
13
unjustified by observations.
• Existence assumption: In the case where individual probabilities can be assigned to
system outcomes in a physically interpretable manner (Section 3.2) we have assumed
that observers constructing physical laws believe they know of all possible outcomes
that constitute the domain of the system.
• Measurements are accurate on average: In all cases, we have assumed that ob-
servers believe they have estimated the behavior of the system accurately through a
series of measurements upon various outcomes of the system.
• Physical constants: Where appropriate, we have substituted physically meaningful
quantities for scaling parameters and variables (e.g. Boltzmann’s constant, Planck’s
constant). We do not claim any a priori reason for these substitutions, but suggest that
their introduction in non-informational physics derivations tend to be no less arbitrary.
Unfortunately, the informational physics framework does not appear to be any closer
than standard formulations in solving the fine-tuning10 problem.
Subjectively speaking, this set of assumptions appears to be quite reasonable, sparse enough
to allow the informational physics principle to be enunciated, yet not so sparse as to require
suspension of disbelief in order to accept the principle’s implications. In plain language, the
informational physics principle, in view of these assumptions, is suggesting the following: take
a set of observers with complete knowledge of the range of behavior of a phenomenon under
observation and give them sufficient observations to estimate some quantity that summarizes
the past behavior of all outcomes of the system. While trying to infer a concise statement
that would allow them to (a) summarize their findings and (b) make predictions about
the system’s behavior, they will all find the same mathematical structures as statements of
physical laws, a circumstance that emerges from the nature of the process of observation and
no ontological reality apart from the observer’s perception.
10Why do the universal physical constants have the values they do?
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4.1 Future prospects
Much of the circumspection that arises with respect to informational physics derives from
the insubstantial and intangible nature of its constituent categories. That is, it is far simpler
to think in terms of electrons than bits, since one can measure the former’s effects in the
physical realm. Almost definitionally, the material (dualistic) definition of physics is far more
amenable to reductionist manipulation than the informational (non-dualistic) definition. It
is almost certain that this will remain a critical bottleneck to the emergence of informational
physics as a mainstream discipline. However, we contend that demonstrating the consis-
tency and duality of informational physics with respect to traditional physics is still not an
enterprise without value. We examine and motivate future efforts along this line of inquiry
in the following three contexts:
• Practical implications: From the practical point of view, the informational view of
physics argues for a reappraisal of developments in approximation techniques in the
light of the existence and continual development of statistical learning algorithms for
different domain representations in the machine learning community. At the very least,
the inference method can guide selection of the appropriate class of analytical meth-
ods appropriate for a particular problem domain. The first component of using the
informational framework in physically realistic setting is domain specification, which
is equivalent to specifying an interesting and non-trivial domain of outcomes S of cor-
responding to physical measurements (for either single particle or ensemble settings).
The critical element in performing inference, once the domain S has been specified, is
the imposition of an appropriate measure to generate meaningful p[s] corresponding
to s ∈ S, which should be a problem of some interest to measure theoreticians. The
rest of the analysis can proceed using well known methods in both the statistics and
computational learning literature.
• Theoretical implications: Much has been made of the necessity of reaching a deeper
understanding of the seemingly counter-intuitive foundations of quantum mechanics.
Furthermore, in recent years, there has been a backlash in some segments of the the-
oretical physics community against the predominance of mathematical manipulation
detached from reality. Informational physics carries the potential of remedying both
these problems, as well as scope for a unification framework potentially more aesthet-
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ically satisfying than any action string theory might hope to derive. In the case of
quantum mechanics, the irreconcilability of local realism with quantum predictions
is trivially resolved by allowing quantum histories to emerge subjectively (an inter-
pretation which is compatible with relational quantum mechanics [10]). Furthermore,
observer-dependent wave function collapse can now be interpreted as an update of
outcome probabilities based on information acquisition. The mathematics of the infor-
mational framework of physics proceeds from well-understood and motivated assump-
tions regarding the nature of reality, which places it favorably in contrast to some more
mathematically sophisticated but less simply interpretable systems.
• Epistemological implications: As our final point, we ask the following related
questions: what are the implications of an informational basis of reality as well as
knowledge about reality (the laws of physics being a subset consisting of statements
regarding ideal scenarios) on (a) the prospect of unification, (b) the prospect of under-
standing the nature of physical laws and (c) the prospect of understanding the nature
of the comprehensibility and predictability of reality?
Considering these questions one by one, it is not evident that the informational frame-
work offers much greater hope for unification in the traditional sense of the term. While
the informational framework is extremely general, the interpretability of its conclusions
in the physical domain cannot occur arbitrarily. Should advances in domain specifica-
tion be feasible, the mathematical power of the informational framework will exceed
that of the standard system. Until then, unification will continue to be equally in-
accessible to either paradigm, though somewhat less philosophically necessary for the
former than the latter.
Regarding the prospect of understanding the nature of physical laws, the informational
framework claims a nearly complete resolution of this problem by showing that they
emerge as special cases of a general inference procedure. The substitution of variables
with specific values however, leaves it open to the fine-tuning criticism, as addressed
earlier. The substitution of variables with quantities that appear to have specific
physical interpretations leaves the framework open to the criticism of non-falsifiability.
Simply put, the informational argument can retrieve existing laws and potentially find
epistemologically-motivated approximations for them, but it cannot find completely
new laws, since the variables that emerge would have no defined physical interpretation.
Since it becomes impossible to construct a scenario where the informational framework
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constructs a law that is ‘false’, the problem of non-falsifiability arises. This is a strong
argument, and one that we are not in a position to refute at the moment. It should,
therefore, be borne in mind while considering the plausibility of the informational
physics hypothesis.
To answer our final question, we consider the promise that informational physics holds
in answering Wigner’s question [17]. An assumption that reality is foundationally based
in information (subjectively, awareness) dovetails quite well with the evidence we have
presented in favor of the hypothesis that knowledge-acquisition about system outcomes
is the foundation of physical laws. Since the informational physics principle declaims
against the ontological reality of observer-independent systems, it explains Wigner’s
observation regarding the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics as a descriptor of
physical reality in the following way: observers construct laws of physics based on their
information extremization apparatus (calculus of variations etc.). All observers who
make the assumptions described in Section 4 will discover the same mathematical (and
cognitive) statements as physical laws. This will make the relevant mathematics appear
to be unreasonably effective in describing what all the observers believe-they-know 11.
Thus, notwithstanding the occasional ambiguity that must necessarily ensue in treating with
slippery concepts like information and awareness while attempting to describe reality, there
appear to be strong physical, mathematical and epistemological reasons for further inves-
tigating the informational physics hypothesis. Establishing the validity of this hypothesis
is a necessary step in facilitating a meaningful discussion of the broader consideration of
awareness being the primal ontological entity.
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